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WE DON'T COUNT!
ROUSSEAU'S GENERAL WILL AS A TOOL
TO JUDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
JUDICIAL DECISIONS RELATING TO THE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN MEXICO
AND THE UNITED STATES
Lao-Tze Smith*
MARCH 18, 2008.
HE presidential elections of the United States in the year 2000 and
of Mexico in the year 2006 were decided by the narrowest margins
in both countries' recent electoral histories.1 Both elections gave
rise to distrust, protest, and resistance among citizens despite-or per-
haps because of-judicial decisions from the countries' highest courts.2
As a result, scholars continue to disagree over the consequences that
these decisions have caused to the institutional legitimacy of their respec-
tive countries.
This paper's object is to defend two propositions through a process of
reflective equilibrium. The first proposition is the notion that the general
will, as expressed by Rousseau, is an adequate mechanism to both mea-
sure the legitimacy of any state action or judicial decision and predict the
effects and repercussions of such actions. The second is the idea that the
performance of the courts in relation to the presidential elections in Mex-
ico in 2006 and the United States in 2000 was poor because the tribunals
*Lao-Tze W. Smith Torres, associate in the New York office of the law firm of
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The author wishes to give special gratitude to
Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University Law School. and Professor
Jests Silva-Herzog Mdrquez. Instituto Technol6gico Aut6nomo de M6xico, for
their support and advice in drafting the paper.
1. Jeffrey L. Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, The Presidency and the Supreme Court
after Bush v. Gore: Implications for Institutional Legitimacy and Effectiveness. 13
STAN. L. & POLlY REV. 101 (2002).
2. See JENARO VILLAMIL & JULIO IBARRA SCHERRER, LA GUERRA SUCIA DE 2006:
LOS MEDI()S Y LOS JLECES (2007): ANDRItS MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR. LA MAFIA
NOS ROBO LA PRESIDENCIA: "SOLO LE HAN QUITADO I:NA PLUMA A NUESTRO
GALLO" 91 (2007). Perhaps the main cause of distrust and protest were the irregu-
larities in the electoral process. but many pages have been dedicated to that topic.
In Mexico, the highest court on electoral matters is not the Supreme Court. but
rather the Electoral Tribunal of the Federation's Judicial Power (TEPJF).
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damaged the institutional legitimacy in their countries by separating
themselves from the general will of their citizens.
To defend these propositions, this paper will interpret Rousseau's view
on the general will in conjunction with the thoughts of John Rawls re-
garding the original position under a veil of ignorance. This paper will
first state the definition of general will it proposes and then apply this
definition to criticize the judicial decisions of the Electoral Tribunal of the
Federation's Judicial Power (TEPJF) during 2006 and the decision of
Bush v. Gore pronounced by the Supreme Court in the United States in
December 2000. Finally, it will use the same definition to explain why
there was greater damage to the institutional legitimacy in Mexico than in
the United States. If Rousseau's definition of general will can justify the
criticism of the courts and explain the difference in damages, then, the
definition itself acquires validity.
I. ROUSSEAU AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AS A TEST TO
EXAMINE THE HEALTH OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM.
In Rousseau's Social Contract we can see a clear standard by which to
grade the legitimacy of a political organism: the general will. Rousseau
wrote:
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and
the general will; the latter considers only the common interest, while
the former is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away
from these same wills the pluses and minuses, which cancel one an-
other, and the general will remains as the sum of the differences. 3
Some scholars have tried to explain this initial definition provided by
Rousseau to give it a more clear and practical sense. 4 One of these expli-
cations says that in the world of Rousseau each citizen has desires and
designs based on what they hold to be good for the community ("com-
mon good will") independent of what is in his own interests or how it
affects his welfare ("particular will"). When faced with any problem,
therefore, each citizen is conscious of both 1) a resolution to the problem
that most benefits him as an individual and 2) a resolution to the problem
that most benefits the community irrespective of how it affects him.
These scholars then hold that a community expresses its general will in so
far as its decisions are based on the common good will, and not on the
particular will, of each citizen.5 In this two-will world, where the general
will of a community is understood based on the common good will's of its
citizens, necessarily one must question the epistemology of the common
good will. How do we, or worse, can we, know the common good will?
This paper proposes that the thoughts of John Rawls on the original
position under a veil of ignorance may help us understand a person's
3. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, 24 (Edicions Leyenda 2006).
4. Gopal Sreenivasan, What is the General Will?, 109 THE PHIL. REV. 545-81 (2000).
5. Id. at 547-48.
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common good will and therefore the general will of a community. Rawls,
in Justice as Fairness, proposes that the best way to uncover would-be
agreements between citizens is through an analysis from the perspective
of the original position.6 The original position is nothing more than a
hypothesis of a pre-socialized world, just as the state of nature was for
Hobbs, which facilitates the analysis of social agreements. Rawls suggests
that the original position requires that citizens be under a veil of igno-
rance.7 This means that the citizens do not know their social rank, the
doctrines to which they adhere, their race, gender, strength, intelligence
and, in our case, whether a certain judicial decision favors them or not.
Rawls holds that from this position, citizens adopt decisions that adhere
to the maximin rule; that is, they choose the alternative whose worst pos-
sible outcome is better than the worst possible outcome of every other
alternative.8 For example, in a community with a limited number of com-
puters, the citizens will choose a resolution whereby the computers are
distributed one per each young person and none to the rest over a resolu-
tion that distributes the same computers arbitrarily. The reason is that
when we compare the possible outcomes of both resolutions it becomes
obvious that the worse result of the second resolution (i.e. that all the
computers end up in the hands of one person only) is far worse that the
worst outcome of the first resolution (i.e. that you may be one of the
persons that does not get a computer). For Rawls this is the first funda-
mental comparison in the process of public reasoning.9 In our analysis,
we will use Rawls' first fundamental comparison to identify the general
will of Mexico and the U.S. with respect to the judicial claims made in
relation to their respective disputed presidential elections.
With this definition in mind we may propose that the level of institu-
tional legitimacy within a country depends positively on the level of con-
formity of state actions to the general will. It is consistent with this
principle to expect that every state organ strive to assure that its actions
are in conformity to the general will. Under this standard, the judicial
decisions of courts are good only when their reasoning is supported by
the general will; decisions to the contrary hurt the institutional legitimacy
within the country.
II. GORE V. BUSH
A. ANTECEDENTS
The narrow results of the U.S. presidential election in the year 2000, in
which despite winning the popular vote, Al Gore lost to George W. Bush
in the electoral college by four votes, including the twenty-five corre-
sponding to the state of Florida, are well known. The Bush victory in
6. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15 (Erin Kelly ed., The Bel-
knap Press of Harvard University Press 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 94-95.
9. Id. at 92-94.
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Florida was by less than .01 percent, or 537 of the 5,963,110 votes cast. 0
The result of the Florida election, for obvious reasons, was the origin of
judicial decisions to be analyzed.
The post-electoral process in Florida is governed by state laws on the
matter.'a This process includes two opportunities to challenge the results
and to have a recount of votes: the first during the protest period and the
second during the complaint period. Within the protest period, the
county canvassing boards may, under their sole discretion, conduct a
manual recount of votes, in addition to the mandatory recounts when the
difference between first and second place is less than 0.5 percent. 12 Dur-
ing the complaint phase the candidates may claim that there were count-
ing errors by the county canvassing boards and petition for a manual
recount.
13
It was during the complaint period that the principal complaint arose-
valid votes had been left uncounted. 14 Florida's election laws state that
there should be a recount if a number of legal votes sufficient to modify
or place in doubt the electoral results were not counted or were rejected
for some other reason. 15 In consideration of this law, the Florida Su-
preme Court determined that the Florida courts may order recounts de
novo without considering the previous decisions or rationales of the
county canvassing boards. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court or-
dered a manual recount of all the uncounted votes 16 because there was no
doubt that there were enough legal votes within the 9,000 uncounted
votes to place the electoral results in question. 17 The assignment of a
vote to a particular candidate, ordered the Court, would be done in such
manner as the "intention of the voter" is respected. 18
The Supreme Court of the United States intervened. 19 After review,
the Court determined that the recount plan of Florida's highest court,
under the principle of "intention of the voter," was contrary to the equal
protection clause of the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution,20 and
dismissed the controversy. Instead of remanding the case to the Florida
10. Yates, supra note 1, at 101. For all results see 2000 Presidential Electoral and Pop-
ular Vote, www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm (last visited Dec. 19 2008).
11. James A. Baker III, Observations on the Florida Electoral Dispute, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 15, 17 (2002); Hugh M. Lee, Oasis or Mirage? Does Bush v. Gore's
Promise of Due Process in Federal Presidential Elections Create a Right Without a
Remedy?, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 54 (2002). To contrast with Mexico,
which is governed by federal laws, see infra III.A.
12. Michael W. McConnell, Two and Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 667 (2001); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 116 (2000) [hereinafter Bush].
13. McConnell, supra note 12, at 657.
14. As opposed to Mexico, where there were complaints of arithmetic errors in addi-
tion to intentionality errors (not counting votes), in the United States, the principal
complaint was about intentionality errors (hanging chad).
15. See Florida's election laws, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 101.168(3), (3)(c) (West 2006).
16. McConnell, supra note 12, at 670.
17. Yates, supra note 1, at 102.
18. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000).
19. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
20. Bush, supra note 12. at 116.
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court to resolve pursuant to its finding, as is customary, the Court surpris-
ingly determined that it was not possible to make any recount because
the Florida legislature wished to terminate the complaint period in con-
formity with 3 USC § 5.21
B. THE REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND THE
GENERAL WILL
The decision of the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore follows the general
will in its holding but defies the general will in its remedy. The Court
held that the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court did not meet
the minimum requirements of the equal protection clause because while
the "intention of the voter" standard is unobjectionable as an abstract
proposition, it requires specific standards in order to assure its equal ap-
plication.22 This holding seems consistent with the general will of the
United States. An example of this can be found in the area of free speech
where it has been established that the common good is generally fur-
thered when there are clear restrictions on the discretion that the authori-
ties have to limit rights. 23 Obviously, without a process that is not
detailed and does not have a clear standard by which to evaluate and
assign the intention of the voter, the recount ordered by the Florida Su-
preme Court was subject to and perhaps even prone to the abuse of dis-
cretion by the persons that were counting votes. Moreover, it is justified
to say that Americans from an original position would choose to limit the
discretion of their authorities. In general it seems unobjectionable to
hold that limiting the discretion of authorities favors the public interest
because it helps to avoid abuse of power and arbitrariness, and as dis-
cussed infra in III.B. In relation to the Mexican election, arbitrariness is
undesirable from the original position under a veil of ignorance. There-
fore, the holding the Supreme Court follows the general will of the
United States.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not limit itself to the holding
and designed a remedy contrary to the general will. Instead of remanding
the case back to Florida's highest court to resolve in conformity to its
holding, as the Supreme Court usually does, it terminated any possibility
of a recount when it determined that the Florida legislators wished to end
the complaint process by December 18 in order to take advantage of the
safe-harbor of 3 U.S.C. § 5.24 The majority decision of the Supreme
Court is questionable not only because it attributed to the Florida legisla-
tors the intention to adhere to section 5, but also because it determined
21. Bush, supra note 12, at 122. 3 USC § 5 states that when the states make a final
pronouncement on the appointment of electors at least six days prior to December
18 such pronouncement will be conclusive on the federal Congress.
22. Bush, supra note 12, at 106.
23. Gold Diggers, LLC v. Town of Berlin, Conn., 469 F.Supp.2d 43, 55 (D. Conn.
2007).
24. David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CR1. L. REV.
737, 741 (2001).
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that the Florida legislators wanted to adhere to section 5 at any cost, in-
cluding leaving election results in uncertainty. 25 Such attribution defies
logic and is not supported by any law or judicial decision of the Florida
courts.
26
This remedy is contrary to the general will of the people of the United
States. First, the remedy is contrary to the precept that historically and
contemporaneously has been used in many public speeches that aspire to
the common good, about the supremacy of state rights over the federal
government. One modern example is the discussion around same-sex
marriages where the conservative Vice-President Dick Cheney is opposed
to the intervention of the federal government because the regulation of
marriages belongs to the states and not the federal government. 27 The
precept of a limited federal government is based on the idea that it is
necessary to prevent the tyranny of the majority, or of private wills, from
developing at a level far from local associations because it will be harder
to revert such impositions thereafter. 28 Therefore, a limited federal gov-
ernment satisfies the maximin rule because an error at the federal level is
worse than an error at a local level considering that an error at the fed-
eral level is harder to revert. Moreover, because each individual has
greater control over her own locality than over the federation, we would
expect that there would be less distancing from the will of citizens at the
local level than the federal (including the citizens' common good will). In
consequence, the remedy of the Supreme Court was contrary to the gen-
eral will of Americans.
Second, it was clear that private wills were part of the Supreme Court
remedy, which is contrary to the general will per se.29 The division be-
tween the justices reflected a political division in the Supreme Court
more than an ideological division because the justices that usually sup-
port the supremacy of state rights, i.e., Rehnquist and O'Connor, sup-
ported the decision that gave the victory to the republican Bush even
though it weakened the principle of limited federal government and the
supremacy of state rights.30 The Supreme Court acted based on its pri-
vate will without considering that the general will calls for an impartial
tribunal which seriously considers the law and which provides a certain
25. Id. at 740.
26. Id. at 740-42; Hugh M. Lee, Oasis or Mirage? Does Bush v. Gore's Promise of Due
Process in Federal Presidential Elections Create a Right Without a Remedy?, 13
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 53, 54 (2002).
27. In opposition to the intervention of the federal government through a constitu-
tional amendment that limits marriage to the union of a man and a woman, see
Michael Foust, Edwards: Same-sex 'Marriage' Issue Should Be Left to States, BAP-
TIST PRESS, Feb 16, 2004, www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=17644; Cheney De-
scribes Same-sex Marriage as State Issue, Cnn Politics, Aug. 25, 2004, http://
edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/24/cheney.samesex/index.html.
28. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25-28 (1835) (especially his
citation to James Madison).
29. Strauss, supra note 24, at 737-38; Yates, supra note 1, at 104.
30. Yates, supra note 1, at 103.
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result.31 On the issue, the district court of New York commented in Don-
ohue: "It is difficult to image a more damaging blow to public confidence
in the electoral process than the election of a president whose margin of
victory was provided by... foreclosing injunctive relief." 32
The Court's partiality is against the general will from the original posi-
tion under a veil of ignorance because citizens ex-ante, following the
maximin rule, would choose the option that produced the maximum gain
in the worst of the outcomes. Assuming that the worse outcome is an
extremely competitive election, it would seem that citizens, without
knowing their position in the election results, would choose a clear elec-
tion that resulted in an unquestioned president with a long process of
dispute over a short process that resulted in a questioned president.
33
The risks of a disputed presidency are too grave to ignore; a public mobil-
ization is always a possible consequence. Moreover, the long-term reper-
cussions are also notable. Six years after the Court's decisions,
Americans are more susceptible to distrust their own democracy.
III. THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON THE
MEXICAN ELECTION
A. ANTECEDENTS
While most Mexicans slept during the night of July 2, 2006, questions
about the results of their presidential election began to come afloat, in
spite of the fact that the first official count of votes, the district count,
would not take place until July 5. The questions arose in the same way as
they did in the American election, as a result of a very competitive race;
the difference between Felipe Calder6n, the winner, and Andr6s Manuel
L6pez Obrador (AMLO) was around 0.5 percent. 34
The post-electoral process in Mexico, unlike the United States, is gov-
erned by federal laws. But, the process itself is very similar. Perhaps a
notable difference is that the votes are initially counted by citizens acting
pro tem as polling officials and not personnel of the district councils. This
difference is notable because "the citizen participants in the boards of the
polling places ... made a great quantity of arithmetic errors, ' 35 in count-
ing votes and because the counting done at polling sites are not recounted
except for certain extraordinary situations.36 Thus, while Pliego estimates
that there were arithmetic errors in 60 percent of the polling places, the
31. Yates, supra note 1, at 105.
32. Donohue v. Board of Elections, 435 F.Supp. 957, 967 (E.D. N.Y. 1976).
33. RAWLS, supra note 6; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS (2d. ed., Belknap Press
2001).
34. Dictamen relativo al computo final de la elecci6n de Presidente de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, declaraci6n de validez de la elecci6n y de Presidente electo, 28-
35, 5 de septiembre de 2006, available at mxvote06.ife.org.mx/pdf/boletin-lazos/
46.pdf [hereinafter Dictamen Final]; FERNANDO PLIEGO CARRASCO, EL MITO DEL
FRAUDE ELECTORAL EN Mxico 54 (2007).
35. PLIEGO CARRASCO, supra note 34, at 33.
36. Id. at 54.
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district councils made a recount in only 0.02 percent of these places. 37
Aside from this difference, the Mexican system, like the American one,
provides two possibilities for recount. The first, as mentioned, is during
the district council counts pursuant to the judgment of the officials. 38 The
second is as a result of a legal challenge to the district council counts.
Of the 300 district counts, 281 were challenged by the parties or citi-
zens. 39 Therefore, the decisions of the TEPJF on the election faced a
reality where the election was highly competitive, questioned, and per-
haps worst of all, with certain irregularities and suspicions of illegality.40
B. THE DECISIONS OF THE TEPJF AND THE GENERAL WILL
The decisions of the TEPJF are contrary to the general will of Mexi-
cans. In spite of recognizing that there were illegalities and irregularities,
including arithmetic errors, the illegal meddling of then President Vicente
Fox and the illegal participation in advertisement by private enterprise
and the national business council, the tribunal in its decision concerning
validity (dictamen de validez) dated September 5, 2006, determined that
the irregularities only affect the validity of the elections if their "effects
measure" in such way that they would have affected the electoral process
"preponderately."'41 Some scholars defend the decision, arguing that the
court was unable to determine the magnitude with which these irregulari-
ties could have determined the result of the election. But, is it not point-
less to ask how we can measure such effects in order to conclude that
they "preponderately" affected the result of the election?
The standard adopted by the TEPJF is arbitrary. The same tribunal
recognizes that it is nearly impossible to design a method by which to
measure such effects that are not arbitrary.42 Moreover, the standard is
arbitrary, at least with respect to the meddling of President Fox, because
requiring evidence of "grave or preponderate effects" with respect to the
illegal meddling of the federal executive, is contrary to previous decisions
of the TEPJF, where the same tribunal annulled elections in the state of
Colima based on the interventions of the executive of the state. In the
Colima case the TEPJF held that irregularities performed by the execu-
tive, as opposed to irregularities committed by other citizens, are consid-
ered grave eo ipso.4 3 In consequence, aside from being legally
questionable, 44 the arbitrariness of the standard cannot represent the
37. Id. at 35, 54
38. Id. at 54-55. During this period 2,864 polling place bundles were opened of the
130,477 polling places installed in the country.
39. Dictamen Final, supra note 34, at 25-26; PLIEGO CARRASCO, supra note 36, at 57.
40. For a good starting point over the discussion on the questions and suspicions re-
volving around the Mexican electoral process, see VILLAMIL & SCHERRER
IBARRA, supra note 2.
41. VILLAMIL & SCHERRER IBARRA, supra note 2, at 162.
42. Dictamen Final, supra note 34.
43. VILLAMIL & SCHERRER IBARRA, supra note 2, at 199.
44. Scherrer Ibarra describes how the standard of gravity and preponderance is not
applicable to the declaration of validity pursuant to article 99 of the Constitution,
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general will because it would be ridiculous to hold that ex-ante the citi-
zens, under a veil of ignorance over their position in relation to an electo-
ral dispute, would prefer arbitrary standards. 45 Arbitrariness is unstable,
fragile, and dangerous. 46 The tribunal contravened the general will when
it chose a standard that is necessarily arbitrary.
In the same fashion, the decision on the challenges (dictamen sobre las
impugnaciones) dated August 5, 2006, is contrary to the general will of
Mexicans with respect to two possible counting errors: arithmetic errors
and intentionality errors.47 The arithmetic error concerns those errors
that occur when totaling votes per candidate in the polling places and in
the district councils. The intentionality error relates to votes that were
not counted because they were not clear in their intention or because
they did not meet certain legal requirements. The TEPJF opts for a stan-
dard that opens the door to arbitrariness in its discussion of intentionality
errors and uncertainty and conflict in its discussion of arithmetic errors.
Mexican law on the intentionality of votes states that the ballots that
contain a mark in more than one square shall be null.48 Such law refuses
to consider a reality, detailed by Zavala, where citizens often identify
their vote in different but equally clear ways. One example is when citi-
zens, after making a mark on the square of the party or coalition they
favor, they also write out the name of the candidate of the same party or
coalition in the space allocated to non-registered candidates. 49 Another
more recurring example occurs when citizens check the square of one
party and cross-out the squares of all other parties. 50 It is not surprising,
therefore, that despite the clarity of the law at issue; it was on this issue
alone that the magistrates of the tribunal were in disagreement. Despite
the disagreement, nonetheless, neither of the two positions within the tri-
bunal could satisfy the general will of Mexicans.
The minority of the TEPJF would have applied the law literally, mak-
ing an argument similar to the one employed by the U.S. Supreme Court
on the principle of equality (equal protection), and therefore suffers from
the same ailments because it refuses to implement a method that guaran-
tees that each vote takes its merited effects without intrusions by arbi-
trary opinions. 51 The majority recognized that the opinion of the
minority would have marginalized thousands of voters, but it was incapa-
ble of designing a specific method that evaded the problems of inequality
but also in relation to the decisions relating to the challenges. This is to say, that
by requiring evidence of grave effects that "preponderately" affect the election,
the TEPJF legislated. VILLAMIL & SCHERRER IBARRA, supra note 2, at 138, 141-
42, 162, 190-92, 199.
45. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 28.
46. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 106. See particularly his discussion on uncertainty.
47. PLIEGO CARRASCO, supra note 34, at 37.
48. Marco A. Zavala, Cuando cuenta un voto, NEXOS, Oct. 2006, at 10.
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and arbitrariness. 52 Without specific standards to evaluate voter inten-
tion, the majority left the determination to the individual standards of the
district councils. It is no surprise, therefore, that some would question
the decisions of the officials in the districts, as there is no way to know the
standards applied or if the standards were applied in a reasonable and
consistent manner. The TEPFJ decision on the intentionality error facili-
tated arbitrariness, and as discussed previously, arbitrariness is contrary
to the general will.
With respect to the arithmetic error, the TEPJF determined that cer-
tain electoral packages (vote bundles from polling places) could be
opened and recounted if there was a "clear error" that could not be cured
with one of the documents attached to the electoral package. This ruling
led to the recount of 11,839 polling places. 53 It should be remembered
that while Pliego estimated that there existed arithmetic errors in 60 per-
cent of the polling places, the 11,839 polling places revised represented
only 8.98 percent of the total polling places installed across the country. 54
Given the importance of the process for the country, the reasons given by
the tribunal for rejecting the recount of the other challenges are unsatis-
factory. For example, it seems judicially ridiculous that the tribunal did
not apply leave to amend to various challenges that contained certain
technical mistakes, such as dismissing several challenges because the
complaints did not identify the polling places being challenged. 55 Would
it be improper to let AMLO include polling places to the complaint dur-
ing the judicial process? Is not certainty worth more?
Ex-ante, in the original position under a veil of ignorance, the general
will of Mexicans would prefer certainty over observing the rules of the
game as some Mexican thinkers hold. 56 The reasons being that the rules
are often imperfect, that the certainty resulting from a total recount tends
to dissipate tensions between private wills confronted, and that a total
recount would weaken any accusation of fraud. Comparing the possible
outcomes of a total recount and the possible outcomes of the tribunal's
decision, we can observe that following the maximin rule a total recount
would be preferable from the original position. The worse outcome of
the tribunal's decision occurred. A great segment of the population dis-
trusts the decision. The electoral body in charge of all federal elections,
the Federal Electoral Institute (WE), suffered damage to its legitimacy
and was eventually renovated. The decision provoked uncertainty and
conflict. The worst possible outcome of a total recount, by comparison,
could have also resulted in an institutional rupture, but without a doubt
the rupture would have been less severe. Assuming that a total recount
would have been contrary to the election laws in place, which is a large
52. Id.
53. Id. Of these recounts there resulted a net gain for AMLO of 10,103 votes.
54. Id.
55. PLIEGO CARRASCO, supra note 34, at 61.
56. Lorenzo Cordova y Pedro Salazar. Un tribunal garantista, NExos, Sept. 2006, at
12.
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supposition, the damage to the administration and rule of law are over-
estimated. Such damages had already occurred and were commonplace
in Mexico. What's one more! With or without a total recount, Mexicans
often read stories of courts that depart from the law and thereby the pub-
lic trust in the administration of law is regularly undermined in Mexico.
The maximin rule also dictates that it is better to perform a recount that
includes all clear votes-even if the recount is not literally in conformity
with the election laws-than to apply election laws that clearly marginal-
ize hundreds of thousands of voters. It is far worse to marginalize hun-
dreds of thousands of voters than to suffer the problems in administration
resulting from a judicial decision that includes the voice of all Mexicans.
The worse outcome is not a future prediction anymore: it is occurring
now in the marginalization of thousands of voters. Therefore, the tribu-
nal distanced itself from the general will of Mexicans.
IV. DAMAGE TO INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
A. THE UNITED STATES
The scholars Yates and Whitford suggest that the legitimacy of the U.S.
Supreme Court and the Presidency of the United States did not suffer
irreparable damage as a result of Bush v. Gore.57 Principally, these schol-
ars base their assertions on polls that show that the American public con-
tinues to support these institutions.5 8 The problem, as they themselves
admit, is that an abyss between two positions within the same public has
been created. While 80 percent of republicans support the Court, only 42
percent of democrats do. 59 While more than 80 percent of republicans
believe Bush won legitimately, only 18 percent of democrats do.60 In
truth, America has become a country of particular (private) wills.
It is without argument, nonetheless, that the relevant institutions did
not suffer the damage to their legitimacy that could have been expected
because of the decision of Bush v. Gore. The lesser-than-expected dam-
ages in the United States is in large part attributable to one man's deci-
sion to leave behind party sentiments and instead follow his common
good will, and what he perceived to be the general will of Americans, by
calling on his followers to respect "the honored institutions of our democ-
racy. '"61 This message was instrumental in order to avoid damages to the
institutional legitimacy in the United States because it facilitated the con-
ciliation of the American people by pursuing a resolution to the dispute
that follows the general will. 62 Thus we can say that while the decision of
the Supreme Court provoked an institutional crisis because it departed
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from the general will of the American people, there was no substantial
damage because one of the parties to the dispute ultimately discarded its
private will in favor of the common good. Such a scenario reinforces the
credibility of the general will as a test for the legitimacy of actions taken
by state institutions.
B. MEXICO
It is not surprising that the decisions of the TEPJF caused a weakening
of the institutional legitimacy in Mexico when it validated an election
with irregularities that affected the "formation of a free public opinion,"
as well as, an election where 772,326 votes were left uncounted.63
Three pieces of information demonstrate such a weakening. First,
many Mexicans continue to believe that there was fraud or otherwise dis-
agree with the decision not to count all the votes; this attitude is illus-
trated by many polls and the production and interest in the film Fraude:
Mexico 2006.64 Second, the election laws in Mexico have suffered sub-
stantial reforms as a result of the 2006 election.65 Third, the directors of
the IFE, the body in charge of the administration of federal election in
Mexico, have been or will be substituted prematurely, including the presi-
dent-director. 66
One explanation for the greater weakening of the institutional legiti-
macy in Mexico than in the United States, aside from fragile state of the
burgeoning Mexican democracy, is the lack of an institution or individual
to act in view of the general will. In both countries, the courts acted con-
trary to the general will and engendered the possibility of a political crisis,
but while Al Gore sought the common good with his gesture of concilia-
tion, in Mexico neither AMLO nor Calder6n subordinated their private
wills, which they had promoted during the campaign, in favor of the com-
mon good. Calder6n, clinging to his own pride, or perhaps not aware of
what was occurring in the streets of Mexico after the election, bragged
that the elections had been "the cleanest and most democratic in the his-
tory," and rejected AMLO's invitation to perform a full recount.67 Aside
from this invitation for a full recount, AMLO equally continued his ardu-
ous defense of the particular interest of the marginalized through polariz-
ing actions such as the sit-ins on Reforma, the constitution of the
legitimate government and the dismissal of the institutions in general. 68
Therefore, both candidates acted under the belief that they represented
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the particular wills of the majority without realizing that the true goal was
to defend the general will of Mexicans; only the latter aspires to the com-
mon good rather than the good only for a particular group. Conse-
quently, as a result of the confrontation of particular wills, the Mexican
institutional system squandered legitimacy.
V. CONCLUSION
The definition which we have adopted of the general will (the aggrega-
tion of the community's citizen's wills that aspire to the common good,
rather than their own good, from an original position under a veil of igno-
rance following the maximin rule) has allowed us to arrive at a point of
reflective equilibrium between our intuition on the poor performance of
the courts in the post-electoral process in Mexico and the United States,
and the notion that the general will is an adequate mechanism to measure
the legitimacy of a state action and predict the effects on the institutional
legitimacy of the same state. The decisions of the TEPJF in Mexico and
the Supreme Court in the United States contravened the general will
from this perspective. The effects on the legitimacy as a result of these
decisions can be equally explained considering the general will. This
means that Rousseau's general will is a useful tool to predict the legiti-
macy of political institutions in a state and also suggest that the decisions
of the TEPJF in Mexico and the Supreme Court in the United States
were incorrect in so far as they acted contrary to the general will of the
citizens of their respective countries.
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